Publications

Induction Reduced

On the Implicit Premise That Makes Inductive Reasoning Deductive

Julian Zavaglia

It is customary in introductory logic to distinguish deductive inference, in which the conclusion follows from the premises with necessity, from inductive inference, in which the conclusion is merely probable. This paper argues that the distinction, while pedagogically convenient, is structurally illusory. Every inductive inference is an enthymeme — a deductive argument with an unstated premise — and once that premise is supplied, the inference proceeds with the same formal force as any deduction. I develop the case through Hume's canonical sunrise example, contrast it with John Stuart Mill's alternative route to the same conclusion (that all syllogism rests on prior induction), and consider three principal objections. The thesis defended is not new in its parts; it is offered as a clean reformulation, and a defence of what I call the unity of inference.