Affirming the consequent
- Form
- P → Q, Q ∴ P
- Example
- If it rained, the pavement is wet. The pavement is wet, so it rained. (It could also have been the sprinkler.)
- Why it fails
- The conditional licenses inferring Q from P, not P from Q.
Informal · I
fallacia · ‘a deception, a trick in argument’
Recurring failure modes of argument. The list below is intentionally bounded — five families, around twenty entries — chosen to cover the cases most likely to appear in real reasoning rather than to be exhaustive.
Index
The taxonomy below follows Copi's standard division — one block of formal (structural) fallacies, and four of informal ones grouped by the kind of mistake the family shares.
Family 01
Failures of structure — invalid argument forms in propositional or syllogistic logic. Detectable from the form alone, independent of content.
Family 02
The premises, even if true, do not bear on the conclusion. Attention is redirected from the question at issue.
argumentum ad hominem
argumentum ad populum
argumentum ad verecundiam
Family 03
Inductive moves whose premises do not warrant the strength of the conclusion. Each of these is a real inductive form gone wrong, not a structural invalidity.
argumentum ad ignorantiam
post hoc ergo propter hoc; cum hoc ergo propter hoc
Family 04
An undefended assumption is built into the argument, so the conclusion is reached without doing the argumentative work.
petitio principii
plurium interrogationum
a dicto simpliciter ad dictum secundum quid
Family 05
Language is used loosely enough that a term or structure shifts meaning between premises and conclusion.
A note on the catalogue
A fallacy index is a sharpening tool, not a moral one. Naming a fallacy in an argument is the beginning of the criticism, not its conclusion: the move that looks like ad hominem may turn out to be a relevant point about the source's reliability, and the move that looks like hasty generalisation may rest on a large sample one had not noticed. The catalogue helps one see what is happening; the judgement remains.
The boundaries between fallacy families are loose. Hasty generalisation belongs equally to defective induction and presumption, depending on which feature one stresses; the slippery slope can be read as a defective inductive chain or as a complex of false-cause links. The taxonomy is a convenience.
The canonical source is Aristotle's Sophistical Refutations(c. 350 BC). The modern standardisation in English-language textbooks is from Irving Copi's Introduction to Logic(since 1953, fourteen editions). Douglas Walton's body of work, from the 1980s onward, treats fallacies dialogically rather than structurally, and is the most influential refinement of the tradition since Copi.